I wasn't sure whether to post this in a new thread or in the FlyingSquirrel thread which is hot right now. Anyway, two headlines grabbed my attention today. First from WND:

Bush sneaking North American super-state without oversight?

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-...RTICLE_ID=50618


Also, from the EUObserver:

Denmark proposes transatlantic marketplace ahead of EU-US summit

http://euobserver.com/9/21844


Then, as I often do, I visited Herb Peter's site FulfilledProphecy.com and found this little article, which ties all of this together and then some (note how 2010 keeps coming up):

The Market of Markets

http://www.fulfilledprophecy.com/the_market_of_markets.html


All of this on the heels of having read Gary Kah's newsletter (Hope fo the World Update) which contains an article called THe Globalization Strategy: America and Europe in the Crucible by Carl Teichrib.

According to the latter article, the US is still considered to be the "mid-wife" of the coming New World Order, but it is the EU model of Regionalization that is ultimately to lead to a global system. The thing is, regionalization isn't viewed as something to be distinguished from the globalist vision, but as a vital characteristic of globalism. I heard somewhere fairly recently that the EU is set up in such a way that it will either succeed and go global, or it will completely crumble and fail miserably. I don't remember the source though.

Dear Daysofnoah,...here's a little more info. on your topic ......................1
Martin Ortega
Global Governance: The European Union’s Contribution
29 May 2006, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
The seminar’s purpose was twofold: (a) to reflect on the prospects and difficulties of global
governance, a notion that can be linked to the idea of effective multilateralism, and ( to
analyse the actual and potential roles of the European Union in global governance. Even
though global governance is not currently high on the international agenda, owing to pressing
specific issues, the need for concerted management of global challenges, such as climate
change, extreme poverty, illegal immigration, lack of resources and financial instability,
remains paramount. The EU and its member states have declared that effective
multilateralism, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order
are their priorities. Now the question is how to put into practice those principles.
First session: Multilateralism in crisis
The seminar’s point of departure was the following paradox: globalisation without
governance. Globalisation appears to be expanding, in the economic, security and other fields,
while the appropriate instruments to manage its consequences are lacking. Neither individual
states nor multilateral institutions and regimes are responding to global challenges
satisfactorily.
One participant to the seminar suggested that the situation would become more worrying
in the future if the projections contained in the EUISS study Long Term Vision 2025 are
accurate. Differences between the global ‘haves’ and ‘haves-not’ will increase. Both within
states and internationally economic and social gaps will grow, making it more difficult to
introduce rules to maintain order. Some regions, and in particular Africa, seem doomed to
economic failure. In other words, ‘globalisation will not be global’. This prospect makes the
European Union’s contribution to the governance of global challenges all the more important.
The central question is, ‘will the Europeans be mere spectators of those developments, or will
we be able to shape in one way or another the future of the international order?’
In the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003, the European Council
supported multilateral solutions to global challenges. However, two and a half years later, one
can argue that multilateralism has not made a lot of progress in international affairs. It can be
even maintained that multilateralism is in crisis. In the seminar’s first session, some recent
examples were considered:
1. The NPT review conference in March 2005 did not produce encouraging
results. Political stalemate at the conference hampered advancement on various
fronts: the CTBT, a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material, nuclear
disarmament, strengthening of the IAEA inspections regime and the treaty’s
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withdrawal provisions. The effectiveness of UN bodies dealing with WMD
and disarmament was also put into question during the seminar.
2. The United Nations 60th anniversary summit in September 2005 did not result
in a clear reinforcement of the organisation. In this particular case – some
participants argued – the EU Member States failed to seize that symbolic
opportunity to define a common vision for the future of the United Nations.
More specifically, instead of negotiating a common position on UN Security
Council enlargement, the Europeans showed profound divisions.
3. In a different context, negotiations to complete the World Trade Organisation’s
Doha round advance very painfully. The WTO’s Director, Pascal Lamy, has
recently declared that only 30 percent of the necessary work to agree on a
framework for cutting tariffs had been done by the April 2006 deadline.1
With an aim to reverse this situation, the seminar’s first session discussed both the idea of
‘effective multilateralism’, which was introduced by the ESS, and the more ambitious notion
of ‘global governance’. Some participants pointed out that the latter had been defined in the
1990s, and it remains to be seen whether it could be resuscitated. Indeed, some general
obstacles and difficulties related to global governance were raised during the debate:
• Leadership: Who is going to take the lead to respond to global threats and
challenges that require rapid reaction? Who is leading the reform of the
international order? The real problem of global governance today – one
participant suggested – is not a crisis of multilateral institutions, but the crisis
in global leadership due to the United States’ weakness on some accounts.
• Complexity: What are the respective roles of states, international organisations
and regimes, and other actors, such as multinational corporations and nongovernmental
organisations? The traditional balance of power cannot apply
today, since we are living in a heterogeneous international system, where the
various actors enjoy different types of power.
• Multilevel multilateralism: International structures co-exist, organised in
various layers, and they share responsibilities with states, which makes
management of global challenges more difficult.
Second session: Global governance: the supply/demand gap
While the objective of the seminar’s first session was to analyse recent cases of failed
multilateralism, the second session had a more constructive aim. In this session, participants
were invited to discuss the global governance gap and deal with the question: what can be
done to improve global governance in specific areas?
Knowledgeable experts were invited to address the issue of global governance in the
following fields: the world economy, energy resources and security.
The picture of global economic and financial imbalances is discouraging. The global
economy is still managed according to the ‘Westphalian’ and ‘elitist’ approach that stemmed
from the Bretton Woods conference, whereas, today, other international actors, such as the
emerging powers, have an important de facto role in economic and financial matters. As a
result, a crisis in the legitimacy of international economic institutions can be detected. New
mechanisms to deal with economic and financial issues globally should be explored. One
1 Mark Landler, ‘After missed deadline, WTO chief fears for talks’, International Herald Tribune, 4 May 2006.
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speaker proposed that the European Union should have a single representation in the IMF,
which would give the Europeans a veto right, as is the case with the United States today. On
the other hand, the limits of economic growth were also discussed. In this respect, one expert
affirmed that ‘continued growth of China and India is unsustainable in the long run’.
Governance of energy resources is problematical, for global demand is rising and global
supply is set to diminish. Both the West and the emerging powers are ‘energy hungry’. The
consumer countries need energy and, therefore, the producers will become more powerful. A
number of solutions to this problem were mentioned: (a) uninterrupted dialogue between
consumers and producers, ( diversification of energy sources, © saving energy. The impact
of increased energy consumption on the environment, climate change and global warming
was also considered. From the security point of view, it was underlined that most of the fossil
fuels that Europe needs are located in the Middle East region, and a large proportion of those
resources is shipped through ‘dire straits’, which makes lines of supply vulnerable. Other
participants argued that ‘securitisation’ of the energy issue was a mistake. Stability in the
Middle East could only be attained through political and economic initiatives.
In the area of global peace and security the governance gap was described as a
combination of under-institutionalised international order and uneven distribution of power.
Collective action and UN reform have been put aside in the last few years and have been
replaced by coalition building and unilateral action, leading to a structural failure of the
international order. As a consequence, we are witnessing a paradox in the security field: ‘a
prevailing logic of anarchy in a highly interdependent world’.
The debate on global governance on peace and security issues focused on the reform of
the United Nations. The following aspects were mentioned:
- Some participants maintained that the UN Security Council should be
expanded in order to ensure its perceived legitimacy.
- Other participants said that an enlarged Security Council would be inefficient
because it will be unable to take decisions.
- Opinions were split on whether the industrialised countries or the less
industrialised countries were hampering change in the United Nations
Charter.
- Some experts advised the creation of a single European group at the UN
General Assembly, including all the EU Member States.
- The need for assigning the UN better resources for peacekeeping, and
increasing its budget, was a point of view shared by several participants.
Third session: Options for global governance
The following illustrative options were presented to the seminar:
1) Status quo option – Management of global affairs is done as in the present. No
major change is introduced in the foreseeable future. Individual states continue
to take the lead, while international institutions and regimes languish.
2) Directoire, or governance through power – The select clubs existing today (G-
8, IMF, UN Security Council, etc.) have an increased role in world affairs. The
current members of the exclusive clubs and ad hoc groups refuse to admit new
members.
3) Reformist option – Little by little, international institutions and regimes are
reformed and adapted to the new needs. In this scenario, painful negotiations
4
lead to modest but useful changes in the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions,
the EU and other regional bodies, and international regimes. However,
synchronization between them is less than perfect.
4) Transformation of existing institutions and regimes – Acknowledging that
states and international institutions, as they are now defined, are incapable of
managing the world’s problems, governments decide to transform existing
institutions and regimes profoundly. Greater coordination between institutions
is agreed upon.
5) Networks – In addition to governments and international organisations,
multinational companies and NGOs representing civil society are involved in
the management of global problems through the creation of governance
networks.
6) Bottom-up governance – A number of cosmopolitan and anti-globalisation
movements are proposing an increased role for the global civil society in global
governance.
7) Constitutional option – Following a global catastrophe, such as a nuclear
accident or drastic climate change, states and other international actors decide
to convene a global constitutional conference, which leads to the creation of
new global institutions and regimes.
Speakers recognised that the current political circumstances are not the most propitious to
envisage a bold reform of global governance. Therefore, a combination of the directoire and
reformist options seems the most likely prospect for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, a whole range of questions can be contemplated from a policy-planning
point of view: should the European Union decide to shift gear from the concept of ‘effective
multilateralism’ to the more ambitious notion of ‘global governance’? Would the 25 EU
Member States reach consensus on this issue? Which political leaders in Europe can push to
include global governance into the EU agenda? And when? Should the Europeans promote
global governance with or without the United States? Should the Europeans wait for the
November 2008 US Presidential elections in order to check whether the new American
Administration has a more pro-multilateral stance and is more sensitive to global challenges?
Be it as it may, the less-than-favourable current political circumstances must not
discourage the Europeans to think about those questions. One participant in the seminar
supported the EU’s ‘intellectual autonomy’ to – at least – reflect on such crucial issues. The
growing tension between the foreign policy agendas of major international actors, which are
mainly national, and the ‘globalisation without governance’ syndrome, which is getting
worse, largely justifies that attitude.
Fourth session and conclusion: What role for the European Union in global governance?
Potentially, the European Union can contribute to global governance in a number of ways, for
instance:
a) Reinforcing international institutions through budgetary and political measures;
Helping to reform the United Nations;
c) Negotiating a intra-European agreement on UNSC enlargement;
d) Promoting region-building across the world;
5
e) Promoting rule of law and human rights more resolutely;
f) Further upholding international law;
g) Proposing the creation of new international bodies and regimes for the protection
of the environment;
h) Contributing to better governance and development in Africa.
However, before identifying specific measures, the European Union and its Member
States should decide what kind of world order they would like to see in the future.
The EUISS Director, Nicole Gnesotto, suggested that, despite the adoption of the
European Security Strategy and other documents and declarations, the European Union has
not addressed this question in depth, which also implies to ascertain what are the EU’s longterm
interests. Three possible models of world order are worth mentioning: the American
model, which intends to transform multipolarity into a new sort of bipolarity between good
and evil; the Chinese model, which combines economic development with realpolitik; and the
European model, based on the conviction that diplomacy, permanent negotiation and
consensus, with the exclusion of the use of force, is the best solution for any international
issue and controversy. The Europeans should strife for the survival of their model, because it
is not clear whether the emerging powers and other international actors will share European
principles and values, in the multipolar world looming on the horizon.
During the debate, there was consensus that the European Union’s contribution to the
international order requires a more determined European foreign and security policy. The
Europeans should first concentrate on the internal disagreements and misunderstandings that
get in the way of such policy: the respective roles of Member States, the Council, the
Presidency, the Commission and other bodies, unanimity vs. qualified majority voting, etc.
Secondly, the Europeans should try to reach agreement with the United States not only on
specific issues but also on the grand design of the world order. However, if this agreement is
not possible, the Europeans should be ready to act alone. It is not possible to conceive of the
European Union as the leading actor in the world, but it can influence other actors to engage
in a global order that is inspired by principles and rules.
The long-term defence of principles and values, such as democracy, human rights and
human dignity, rule of law, international law and multilateralism, in a multipolar, multicultural
and rapidly changing global environment, necessitates a sound and durable European
commitment.
6
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Carlos ÁLVAREZ-PEREIRA, President, INNAXIS Research Institute, Madrid
Stephen BOUCHER, Co-Secrétaire Général, Notre Europe, Paris
Pierre-Antoine BRAUD, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Lothar BROCK, Professor, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt
Nicole GNESOTTO, Directeur, Institut d’Etudes de Sécurité de l’Union européenne, Paris
Giovanni GREVI, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Fred HALLIDAY, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and
Political Science, London
Otmar HÖLL, Director, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna
Caroline HOLMQVIST, Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Solna
Andréas KOTIDIS, Conseiller, Ambassade de Grèce, Paris
Gustav LINDSTROM, Senior Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Sylvie MATELLY, Chercheur, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, Paris
Sandor MOLNAR, Minister Counsellor/Deputy PSC Representative, Permanent
Representation of Hungary to the EU, Brussels
Enrique MORA, Deputy Head, High Representative’s Cabinet, EU Council, Brussels
Egidius NAVIKAS, Counsellor, Permanent Representation of Lithuania to the EU, Brussels
Alar OLLJUM, Head of Unit Forward Studies, European Commission, Brussels
Martin ORTEGA, Senior Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Quentin PERRET, Chercheur, Fondation Robert Schuman, Paris
Walter POSCH, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Adam Daniel ROTFELD, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Head of International
Consultative Committee, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw
Jean-Marc SIROËN, Professeur de science économique, Université Paris Dauphine, Paris
Karen E. SMITH, Reader in International Relations, London School of Economics and
Political Science, London
Mario TELÓ, Président, Institut d’Etudes Européennes de l' Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Bruxelles
Bruno TERTRAIS, Maître de recherche, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris
Piotr TULEJ, Head of Renewable Energy Unit, International Energy Agency, Paris
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Observers:
Georghe CIASCAI, Visiting Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Gearóid CRONIN, English language editor, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Johan EDQVIST, Intern, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Marie GIBERT, Visiting Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Catherine GLIÈRE, Head of Publications & Communication, EU Institute for Security
Studies, Paris
Srdjan GLIGORIJEVIC, Visiting Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Stefano RECCHIA, Visiting Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
Johanna VALENIUS, Visiting Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies
....................................................................benny